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Abstract 
In this paper we introduce a new chaotic stream cipher Mmohocc which utilizes the 
fundamental chaos characteristics. The designs of the major components of the cipher are 
given. Its cryptographic properties of period, auto- and cross-correlations, and the 
mixture of Markov processes and spatiotemporal effects are investigated. The cipher is 
resistant to the related-key-IV attacks, Time/Memory/Data tradeoff attacks, algebraic 
attacks, and chosen-text attacks. The keystreams successfully passed two batteries of 
statistical tests and the encryption speed is comparable with RC4. 
 
Keywords: chaos, chaotic map and orbit, stream cipher, security analysis. 
 
1   Introduction 
 
Claude E. Shannon [Shannon 1949] indicated that stretch-and-fold mechanism of mixing 
transformation is an important component of a cipher and it is also a way to confuse and 
diffuse messages. The chaotic dynamical systems, which exhibit unpredictable, mixing, 
ergodic, and extremely sensitive to initial conditions, have shown strong connection with 
cryptography since its inception. It has attracted a broad interest among cryptographic 
researchers to investigate the cryptographic applications for chaotic properties [Baptista 
1998, Alvarez 1999, Jakimoski 2001, Fridrich 1998, Kocarev 1998, Argyris1 2005]. 
However the properties of normal chaos systems are based on continuous systems and 
they are long-term behaviors. Due to limited resources and computational power in 
digital systems those properties could be severely degraded or even disappeared. In order 
to use chaotic properties in cryptosystems, we have devised a technique which 
accelerated chaotic behaviors more rapidly than those in a normal chaos system. 
 
The Mmohocc [Zhang 2006] (pronounced “mow-hock”), an acronym for multi-map orbit 
hopping chaotic cipher, is still under development. It is a software stream cipher without 
authentication mechanism and satisfies the Profile-1 criteria for the ECRYPT Stream 
Cipher Project [Ecrypt 2005]. Its primary goal is to exploit basic properties of chaos 
systems to design a cryptographically strong, fast, and feasible cipher. By using multiple 
maps, i.e., multiple chaos systems, the Mmohocc produces an extremely long chaotic 
sequence inspired by Vernam’s one-time pad. By hopping between multiple orbits 
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generated from multiple maps the cipher obtains its confusion and diffusion properties in 
a much faster way, it is a basic asset for any good cryptosystem. 
 
For any stream cipher at each time unit, e.g. a clock tick for Linear Feedback Shift 
Register (LFSR)-based stream cipher, the keystream unit produced by the cipher is 
obtained by applying a filtering/output function to the current internal state. The internal 
state is then updated by a state transition function. Both filtering function and transition 
function must be chosen carefully in order to make the underlying cipher resistant to 
known attacks [Canteaut 2005]. In our Mmohocc cipher the filtering function is an S-
Box-like function and the state transition function is a bank of multiple chaotic maps. 
 
A chaotic map F is a map/function, usually a non-linear discrete dynamical iteration 
equation, which exhibits some sort of chaotic behavior. A chaotic orbit is the trajectory 
that a chaotic map iterated. Given Rx ∈0 and a chaotic map F, we define the orbit of  
under F to be the sequence of points , 
0x
0x )( 01 xFx = , ,  , …. The 
point  is called the seed of the orbit [Devaney 1992]. 
)( 0
2
2 xFx = )( 0xFx nn =
0x
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 we describe the construction, 
major components, and pseudo code implementation of the Mmohocc cipher. In Section 
3 the cryptographic properties and security analysis against some attacks are investigated. 
Section 4 we briefly present randomness test results and encryption speed performance 
against RC4. Finally the conclusions are drawn in Section 5.  
 
2   The Mmohocc – A Chaotic Stream Cipher 
 
The Mmohocc “leaps” among substantially many chaotic orbits to “pick up” its random 
sequence points. The base ground for random sequences is spread among lots of chaotic 
orbits, which are generated from multiple chaotic maps. The notion of orbit-hopping is 
also inspired from the frequency-hopping (FH) communication. It is one of the 
modulation methods in spread spectrum communications, in which radio signals, 
following a hopping pattern, switch a carrier among many frequencies. A hopping pattern 
is a predefined pseudorandom sequence known to both transmitter and receiver 
[Wikipedia].  
 
Fig. 1 shows the construction blocks of the Mmohocc. The Key Scheduling expands a 
128-bit (or 256-bit, or 512-bit) key into 8 (or 16) subkeys (SKs) for controlling the 
operations of multiple chaotic maps. Each subkey contains certain number of fields. 
Among them a field called hopping-pattern serial number (hpsn) is used by the Hopping 
Mechanism to govern the jumping behavior among the chaotic orbits. In the following 
subsections we will explain some of the major building components of the cipher. 
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Fig. 1   Block Diagram of the Mmohocc Cipher 
2.1   Chaotic Map Bank 
 
For the pseudo random number generator of the stream cipher, we are using a set of 
chaotic maps from the Map Bank whose parameters are properly tuned to ensure that all 
maps lead to chaotic. A map is chaotic [Wikipedia] if it is sensitive to initial conditions, 
topologically mixing, and its periodic orbits are dense. 
 
In our experimental system, we are using a variety of logistic maps and quadratic maps. 
Both types have been well studied and understood [Devaney 1992]. The logistic map is 
defined as 
)1(1 nnn xrxx −=+ ,  )1,0(∈nx
 
where . Most values of r beyond 3.57 exhibit chaotic behavior (but there are still 
certain isolated values of r that appear to show non-chaotic behavior, e.g. ). 
40 ≤≤ r
82.3=r
 
The quadratic map is defined as  and its behavior depends on parameter c. 
Most values of c beyond –1.45 left exhibit chaotic behaviors. When c is close to –2 the 
orbits xn distribute within (–2, +2), i.e. . We choose c between –1.9 to –2 
for our set of quadratic maps. 
cxx nn +=+ 21
)2,2( +−∈nx
 
     
(a)                                                               (b) 
Fig. 2   Logistic Maps (a) and Quadratic Maps (b) 
(Using the same initial value x0 = 0.1 and x0 = 0 for all r’s and all c’s, respectively.) 
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In the implementation, for logistic and quadratic maps we choose r and c properly to 
avoid windows (openings), see Fig. 2. 
 
2.2   Key, Key Scheduling, and Initialization Vector 
 
Currently Mmohocc has three versions, each with 128-, 256-, and 512-bit key, we call 
them Mmohocc-128, Mmohocc-256, and Mmohocc-512, respectively. 
 
The Mmohocc-128 / 256 uses 8 chaotic maps (#maps = 8) and a 64 bits initialization 
vector (IV). This is like it has 8 rounds in parallel (simultaneously). Each round needs a 
subkey to control the behavior of the corresponding map. Key scheduling is as follows. 
 
Step-1: Halve the key and IV. The key is written in the form KLKR, where KL consists of 
the first 64 / 128 bits and KR consists of the last 64 / 128 bits. And IV is written in the 
form VLVR, where VL consists of the first 32 bits and VR consists of the last 32 bits. 
 
Step-2: Concatenate the halves as VLKL and VRKR. They are now 96 / 160 bits each. 
 
Step-3: Expand the two concatenations. Hash VLKL and VRKR with SHA256, we get two 
256-bit hashes  and )(256 LLL KVSHAH = )(256 RRR KVSHAH = . 
 
Step-4: Interweave and split. Interweave HL and HR bit-by-bit to get a 512-bit long string, 
then split it into 8 even substrings each with 64-bit k1, k2, …, k8. They are 8 subkeys for 8 
chaotic maps, correspondingly. 
 
For Mmohocc-512, the key scheduling is similar to Mmohocc-128/256, the difference is 
that it uses 16 chaotic maps and a 128-bit IV. 
 
This key scheduling provides a fine chopping to the input key. Sufficiently use the key 
and IV information. We expand the key into subkeys, does not reduce the key space. 
 
For our system, IVs are multiple 64 bits. For Mmohocc-128 / 256 the IV is 64-bit; for 
Mmohocc-512, the IV is 128-bit. 
 
2.3   Hopping Patterns 
 
The hopping pattern is a predefined pseudorandom sequence of certain number of orbits, 
it tells how Mmohocc hops among orbits. In the current version the hpsn field of a 
subkey takes 8 bits long, therefore it can be changed between 0 and 255. Each hpsn 
corresponds to one of available hopping patterns, which are stored in a lookup table. For 
instance, if a chaotic map has 11 orbits and its hpsn is 141, then the hopping-pattern is {2, 
1, 9, 11, 10, 6, 5, 8, 7, 4, 3} is returned from the lookup table. We know that when it 
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comes to this map Mmohocc extracts random numbers on orbit 2 first and then orbit 1, 
orbit 9, … orbit 3 in this order. For more details, see Table 2 in Appendix A. 
 
2.4   Random Number Extraction 
 
A chaotic orbit point xn is a real number (in the case of logistic map, xn < 1.0) and is 
represented in a data type of double in computer. We extract two smaller integers as 
random numbers from the point xn in the following method, see Fig. 3. By doing so, we 
further muddle the bits and add additional randomness to the keystream. This is the 
filtering function of the cipher, a multi-output Boolean function. It acts like an S-Box 
with 32-bit-in and 16-bit-out.   
 
• Step 1: Convert double type xn into a 32-bit integer by multiplying 252. 
• Step 2: Split the above integer into four 8-bit integers a, b, c, d. Here a and d are 
the most left and right 8-bit, b and c are in the middle. Then the output two 
smaller pseudorandom integers are: cap ⊕=  and dbq ⊕= .  
 
 
a b c d
p q 
Fig. 3   Random Number Extraction 
 
2.5   Pseudo-code Implementation 
 
Here is the pseudo-code implementation for the main part of the Mmohocc cipher. 
 
keyScheduling() 
initializeMaps(seeds[i],offsets[i]) 
initializeHoppingPatternArray(hopp[i][j])  
for_1 i=0 to NUM_OF_MAPS   //maps 
   for_2 j=0 to NUM_OF_ORBITS_OF_MAP_i   //orbits 
      startOrbit = seeds[i]+hopp[i][j]*offsets[i]*hopping_skew; 
      for_3 s to SETTLES_OF_MAP_i     // settles 
         //iterate MAP_i SETTLES_OF_MAP_i times 
      end_for_3 
      for_4 k=0 to SAMPLES_OF_MAP_i   // samples 
         //iterate MAP_i once 
         generateKeystream(keystream) 
         ciphertext = keystream + plaintext 
      end_for_4 
   end_for_2 
end_for_1 
 5
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3   Security Analysis to the Mmohocc Cipher 
 
In this section we investigate the period, auto- and cross-correlations of keystreams, 
describe the cipher in Markov process and spatiotemporal lattices, and cryptanalyze the 
security of the cipher against some well known attacks on stream ciphers. 
 
3.1   Period 
 
We all know that any chaotic orbit will eventually become periodic in computer 
realization with a finite precision. However, when we have many chaotic maps and each 
map generates sufficiently large number of chaotic orbits, the period of the mixture of the 
orbits will be extremely large. 
 
State space S in bits is (#maps * #orbits * 32). If #maps = 16, #orbits = 20 ~ 35.  In 
average the state space is 16*27*32 = 13824-bit. This ensures that the period of the 
keystream is extremely big. But the exact period of Mmohocc is difficult to predict, it 
also depends on selection of map coefficients and other coefficients in the 
implementation, for example, the “hopping skew” to offset[i] (0.19, 0.29, or other small 
numbers bigger than 0.01). The average period of the keystream is approximately 213824.  
 
3.2   Auto- and Cross-correlations 
 
The cross-correlation is a measure of similarity of two bit sequences. It is a function of 
the relative time/lag between the sequences. Large cross-correlations between sequences 
mean that the sequences are very similar to each other and usually not statistically 
independent. The auto-correlation of a sequence sn gives the amount of similarity 
between the sequence sn and a shift of sn by m positions. It is simply the cross-correlation 
of the sequence against a time-shifted version of itself. In general it is desirable to have as 
small values as possible for the correlation (except for m = 0 in the auto-correlation) to 
ensure independence of sequences. It is that the auto- and cross-correlations are δ-like 
function and close-to-zero, respectively. 
 
If we treat the keystreams produced by the Mmohocc cipher as bit sequences, we can 
examine the similarities between the sequences by calculating the auto- and cross-
correlations. We take bit sequence length N, sliding from –N/2 to +N/2. 
 
We use the following correlation definition formulas to calculate the auto- and cross-
correlations. The auto-correlation AC at lag m for the sequence sn(i)is (here n+m is 
performed modulo N) 
∑
=
+∞→ −−=
N
n
nNi
iisiis
N
mAC
1
mn )]()()][()([
1lim)( μμ . 
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And the cross-correlation CC at lag m for the sequences sn(i) and sn(j) is 
∑
=
+∞→ −−=
N
nN
jsiis
N
mCC
1
mnnij )]j()()][()([
1lim)( μμ , 
 
where )(iμ  and )( jμ  are the averages (expected values) for sn(i) and sn(j), respectively. 
Here are two examples from the experiment and we find that the auto-correlation is and. 
 
Fig. 4 is obtained by arbitrarily choosing two bit sequence segments (the top two for 
N=2048 bits and the bottom two for N=8192 bits) from two long different keystreams. 
The average auto-correlation AC(m) is very close to 0 everywhere except at m=0, i.e. a δ-
like function. The cross-correlation CC(m) is close-to-zero everywhere. Also we can see 
that the longer the sequences, the less correlations are between the sequences.    
 
     
 
     
 
Fig. 4   Auto- and Cross-Correlation for N=8192 and N=2048 
 
3.3   Mixture of Markov Processes and Spatiotemporal Effects 
 
The cipher system is deterministic as long as the nonlinear equations are defined, 
however, it is a rather complicated mixture of multiple Markov processes. In the 
Mmohocc-128 cipher there are 8 chaotic maps 
 
)( ,01, nini sFs =+ , )( ,11, nini tFt =+ , )( ,21, nini uFu =+ , )( ,31, nini vFv =+ , 
)( ,41, nini wFw =+ , )( ,51, nini xFx =+  , )( ,61, nini yFy =+ , )( ,71, nini zFz =+ , 
 
where F0 ~ F7 are 8 chaotic maps, n is time index and i is orbit index. The sequence of 
iterative equations produces a stochastic process, a mixture of 8 Markov processes due to 
 7
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hopping and mixing process in the finite state space. This makes the cycle of the mixed 
Markov process even longer [Freedman 1962]. 
 
For instance, when the system iterates to chaotic map F1, according to the subkey for the 
map #orbits = 11, #samples = 17, and its hopping-pattern is {7, 3, 9, 1, 6, 10, 4, 5, 2, 11, 
8}. Then when it comes to this map the Mmohocc picks 17 points on orbit 7 first (t7,0, t7,1, 
…, t7,16) and then another 17 points on orbit 3  (t3,0, t3,1, …, t3,16), then on orbit 9  (t9,0, t9,1, 
…, t9,16), … , on orbit 11  (t11,0, t11,1, …, t11,16) in this order. If we put them in a 2-D array, 
it will be a #orbits rows and #samples columns points array 
 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
16,81,80,8
16,31,30,3
16,71,70,7
,,,
,,,
,,,
ttt
ttt
ttt
L
MOMM
L
L
. 
 
Or we can represent it in a 1-D array as 
),,,,,,,,,,,( 16,81,80,816,31,30,316,71,70,7 ttttttttt LLLL . 
 
Then according to the aforementioned random number extraction method, the Mmohocc 
generates (#orbits x #samples) random numbers. They constitute a segment of the 
random numbers. All segments constitute a much complicated keystream with extremely 
large period. On different map, #orbits, #samples, and the corresponding hopping-pattern 
are different. The three factors determine the random number extraction base array.   
 
If we treat each chaotic orbit as one dimension in space, then our Mmohocc cipher will 
be a spatiotemporal dynamical system. It exhibits chaotic properties in both space and 
time. 
 
Multiple maps and multiple orbits spread chaotic properties to multi-dimensional 
directions. This property makes the Mmohocc cipher a collection of multiple 
spatiotemporal chaotic systems without coupling. In general, a spatiotemporal chaotic 
system is described by CML (Coupled Map Lattice) model [Willeboordse 1994].  
 
))1(())(()1()(1 −+−=+ ixfixfix nnn εε  
 
where n is the time index, i =1, 2, …, N is the space/lattice index (N is the lattice size), 
and ε the coupling coefficient. The f is mapping function, i.e., the chaotic map. For 
0→ε , i.e. 
))(()(1 ixfix nn =+  
 
there is no coupling. Therefore local neighborhoods have no influence on the behavior of 
the CML. This situation represents independently operating local orbits at each lattice 
site. In the multi-map orbit hopping situation there are multiple mapping functions 
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involved F0, F1, …, Fk. And the size of the lattice N (number of orbits) is a variable, it 
depends on the key. 
 
Besides the speed advantage by parallel computation, the spatiotemporal chaotic system 
further enhances time and space mixing property. 
 
3.4   Security Against Attacks 
 
An IV allows a stream cipher to produce a unique stream independent from other streams 
produced by the same encryption key, without having to go through a re-keying process 
[Wikipedia]. In the key scheduling procedure the hash function guarantees that the key 
plus IV is chopped into subkeys in a very complicated manner. Even a simple 
incremental IV is used, the cipher is still resistant to related-IV attacks. This cipher is also 
immune to the subkey guessing and related-key attacks, because the key is not simply 
applied to chaotic maps instead it is expanded into subkeys by secure hash functions. 
Obtaining a few subkeys has no help on deducing the key unless the key scheduling 
procedure is totally insecure. Although this costs a little bit more time, this is just a one-
time initialization procedure. 
 
The Mmohocc cipher is resistant to Time/Memory/Data tradeoff attack. Such an attack 
has two phases: in the preprocessing phase an adversary explores the structure of the 
stream cipher and summarizes his findings in large tables. In the real attack phase the 
adversary uses the pre-computed tables and actual data produced from a particular 
unknown key to find the secret key quickly [Biryukov 2000]. The TMD complexity of 
the cipher is much larger than 2128. The large number of states (period 213824 is large 
enough) eliminates the threat of the attack. Also from [Babbage 1996] if the state space is 
much larger than the number of secret keys, then this attack will provide no 
improvement. The extended Time/Memory/Key tradeoff attack [Biryukov 2005] can be 
prevented by using keys longer than 128-bit. 
 
Algebraic attacks on stream ciphers [Courtois 2003, 2003, 2005] recover the key by 
solving an overdefined system of multivariate equations. Such attacks can break LFSR-
based stream ciphers with linear feedback when the output is obtained by a Boolean 
function. The Mmohocc is a chaotic cipher and the transition function has strong non-
linear properties and it is immune to this kind of attacks by nature. Besides, the cipher is 
using an S-Box-like filtering function with 32-bit input and 16-bit output.  
 
There are other attacks to be considered here. The ciphertext-only attack tries to use the 
output cipher to recover the key; it is in some sense equivalent to brute force attack. The 
key space for the cipher is large enough, at least 2128. So it is not feasible to apply these 
attacks to the cipher.  
 
The known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, and chosen-ciphertext attacks will be carefully 
checked here. A known-plaintext attack is one that an adversary knows one or more 
plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts. Chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attack implies 
 9
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that an adversary has access to the encryption/decryption equipment, therefore s/he can 
choose any plaintexts/ciphertexts and get the corresponding ciphertexts/plaintexts. The 
objective of those attacks is to deduce the key [Menezes 1996]. 
 
Binary representations of variables a, b, c, d, p, and q involved in filtering/output 
functions in Section 2.4 are , , …, . Since  and 
, the following equations  
710 aaa K 710 bbb K 710 qqq K cap ⊕=
dbq ⊕=
  
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
⊕=
⊕=
⊕=
777
111
000
cap
cap
cap
M  and  
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
⊕=
⊕=
⊕=
777
111
000
dbq
dbq
dbq
M
 
hold. In chosen-text attacks an adversary knows a keystream number  
does not mean that s/he can solve the above equations to get the state, since 16 equations 
are not sufficient to obtain 32 unknowns . This S-box-
like filtering function is a compression function with 200% compress ratio (32-bit-in/16-
bit-out). This satisfies that the filtering function must not leak too much information on 
the internal state [Canteaut 2005]. Even an adversary can completely recover the all 
subkeys from the these attacks, s/he still have no better way than brute force to obtain the 
key, since reversing the key scheduling procedure is hard assuming the hash used is a 
good one-way function. 
710710 qqqppp KK
710710710710 dddcccbbbaaa KKKK
 
Often it is possible to analyze the behavior of a subsystem in dependence of a certain 
parameter. When key bits are directly used as parameter bits the determination of this 
parameter reduces the key space by the corresponding number of bits [Kelber 2005]. The 
key scheduling (in subsection 2.2) procedure turns the secret key into 8 (or 16) subkeys in 
a very complicated manner, so we avoid the problem from happening. 
 
In distinguishing attack to stream ciphers an adversary can distinguish between the 
keystream of a particular cipher and the output of a truly random number generator with a 
non-negligible probability. In practice distinguishing attack is not a security issue [Rose 
2002], therefore we do not consider it as a threat to the cipher. 
 
4   Randomness Evaluation and Comparison with RC4 
 
For randomness of keystreams produced by the Mmohocc cipher we performed two 
stringent batteries of statistical tests: the NIST Suite [Rukhin 2001, NIST 2001] and the 
DIEHARD Suite [Marsaglia 1995]. The keystreams successfully passed the randomness 
statistical tests with satisfactory results [Zhang 2006], see Table 3 and 4 in Appendix B.  
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Comparing with stream cipher RC4, Table 1 shows that the Mmohocc cipher has similar 
encryption speed. However the Mmohocc is using more complicated algorithm than RC4 
and without key scheduling algorithm weaknesses found in RC4 [Fluhrer 2001].  
 
Table 1   Speed Comparison with RC4 
 
 584KB 11,200KB 22,400KB 145,600KB 
RC4 0.047s 1.093s 2.109s 11.032s 
Mmohocc 0.093s 1.719s 3.468s 22.719s 
 
5   Conclusion 
 
Based on fundamental chaos characteristics of mixing, unpredictability, and sensitivity to 
initial conditions and multi-map orbit-hopping technique a new chaotic cipher Mmohocc 
is built. In the paper we discussed the major components of the cipher: chaotic map bank, 
key-scheduling, IV, hopping mechanism, random number extraction, and pseudo-code 
implementation. From security analysis in Section 3, we know that the cipher has 
extremely long period, δ-like auto-correlations, close-to-zero cross-correlations, and it is 
a stochastic process of mixture of multiple Markov processes. The cipher is resistant to 
related-key-IV attacks, Time/Memory/Data tradeoff attacks, algebraic attacks, and 
chosen-text attacks. In the respect of randomness evaluation the keystreams successfully 
passed two most popular batteries of statistical tests and the encryption speed is similar to 
RC4’s.  
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Appendix A   Hopping Pattern Lookup Table 
 
Table 2   Partial Hopping Patterns for 11 Orbits (HP-Hopping Pattern) 
 
HP Orbit Permutation Sequence 
(from Sequential Set) 
HP Orbit Permutation Sequence 
(from Swapped Set) 
0 (1,2), (3,4), (5,6), (7,8), (9,10,11) 120 (2,1), (4,3), (6,5), (8,7), (9,11,10) 
1 (1,2), (3,4), (5,6), (9,10,11), (7,8) 121 (2,1), (4,3), (6,5), (9,11,10), (8,7) 
2 (1,2), (3,4), (7,8), (5,6), (9,10,11) 122 (2,1), (4,3), (8,7), (6,5), (9,11,10) 
3 (1,2), (3,4), (7,8), (9,10,11), (5,6) 123 (2,1), (4,3), (8,7), (9,11,10), (6,5) 
4 (1,2), (3,4), (9,10,11), (5,6), (7,8) 124 (2,1), (4,3), (9,11,10), (6,5), (8,7) 
5 (1,2), (3,4), (9,10,11), (7,8), (5,6) 125 (2,1), (4,3), (9,11,10), (8,7), (6,5) 
6 (1,2), (5,6), (3,4), (7,8), (9,10,11) 126 (2,1), (6,5), (4,3), (8,7), (9,11,10) 
7 (1,2), (5,6), (3,4), (9,10,11), (7,8) 127 (2,1), (6,5), (4,3), (9,11,10) (8,7) 
8 (1,2), (5,6), (7,8), (3,4), (9,10,11) 128 (2,1), (6,5), (8,7), (4,3), (9,11,10) 
9 (1,2), (5,6), (7,8), (9,10,11), (3,4) 129 (2,1), (6,5), (8,7), (9,11,10), (4,3) 
10 (1,2), (5,6), (9,10,11), (3,4), (7,8) 130 (2,1), (6,5), (9,11,10), (4,3), (8,7) 
11 (1,2), (5,6), (9,10,11), (7,8), (3,4) 131 (2,1), (6,5), (9,11,10), (8,7), (4,3) 
12 (1,2), (7,8), (3,4), (5,6), (9,10,11) 132 (2,1), (8,7), (4,3), (6,5), (9,11,10) 
13 (1,2), (7,8), (3,4), (9,10,11), (5,6) 133 (2,1), (8,7), (4,3), (9,11,10), (6,5) 
14 (1,2), (7,8), (5,6), (3,4), (9,10,11) 134 (2,1), (8,7), (6,5), (4,3), (9,11,10) 
15 (1,2), (7,8), (5,6), (9,10,11), (3,4) 135 (2,1), (8,7), (6,5), (9,11,10), (4,3) 
16 (1,2), (7,8), (9,10,11), (3,4), (5,6) 136 (2,1), (8,7), (9,11,10), (4,3), (6,5) 
17 (1,2), (7,8), (9,10,11), (5,6), (3,4) 137 (2,1), (8,7), (9,11,10), (6,5), (4,3) 
18 (1,2), (9,10,11), (3,4), (5,6), (7,8) 138 (2,1), (9,11,10), (4,3), (6,5), (8,7) 
19 (1,2), (9,10,11), (3,4), (7,8), (5,6) 139 (2,1), (9,11,10), (4,3), (8,7), (6,5) 
20 (1,2), (9,10,11), (5,6), (3,4), (7,8) 140 (2,1), (9,11,10), (6,5), (4,3), (8,7) 
21 (1,2), (9,10,11), (5,6), (7,8), (3,4) 141 (2,1), (9,11,10), (6,5), (8,7), (4,3) 
22 (1,2), (9,10,11), (7,8), (3,4), (5,6) 142 (2,1), (9,11,10), (8,7), (4,3), (6,5) 
23 (1,2), (9,10,11), (7,8), (5,6), (3,4) 143 (2,1), (9,11,10), (8,7), (6,5), (4,3) 
24 (3,4), (1,2), (5,6), (7,8), (9,10,11) 144 (4,3), (2,1), (6,5), (8,7), (9,11,10) 
25 (3,4), (1,2), (5,6), (9,10,11), (7,8) 145 (4,3), (2,1), (6,5), (9,11,10), (8,7) 
 
Note: the numbers within each subgroup can be arbitrarily re-arranged. For example in pattern 141, 
the numbers in subgroup (9, 11, 10) could be rearranged as (10, 9, 11) or as (11, 9, 10).  
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Appendix B   Randomness Test Results 
 
Table 3   Mean and Variance of p-values for A Large Bit Sequence for NIST Suite 
 
TSN     Test Name Mean of 
p-value 
Variance Conclusion 
1 Approximate Entropy 0.5146 0.0857 Success 
2 Block Frequency 0.5040 0.0844 Success 
3 Cumulative Sums (Forward) 0.4777 0.0799 Success 
 Cumulative Sums (Reverse) 0.4824 0.0815 Success 
4 Fast Fourier Transform (Spectral) 0.4799 0.0800 Success 
5 Frequency (Mono-bit) 0.4894 0.0827 Success 
6 Lempel-Ziv Compression 0.5024 0.0823 Success 
7 Linear Complexity 0.5024 0.0823 Success 
8 Longest Runs of Ones 0.5121 0.0849 Success 
9 Maurer’s Universal Statistical 0.5000 0.0889 Success 
10 Non-Overlapping Template Matching 0.4997 0.0833 Success 
11 Overlapping Template Matching 0.4970 0.0830 Success 
12 Random Excursions 0.5087 0.0835 Success 
13 Random Excursions Variant 0.5103 0.0813 Success 
14 Rank 0.4963 0.0841 Success 
15 Runs 0.4980 0.0841 Success 
16 Serial 0.5024 0.0847 Success 
(TSN: Test Serial Number) 
 
 
Table 4   p-values from the Diehard Statistical Test Suite 
 
TSN     Test Name p-value Conclusion 
1 Birthday Spacing 0.3213 Success 
2 Overlapping 5-Permutation 0.1489 Success 
3 Binary Rank (31 x 31 Matrices) 0.8363 Success 
4 Binary Rank (32 x 32 Matrices) 0.3227 Success 
5 Binary Rank (6 x 8 Matrices) 0.4506 Success 
6 Bitstream 0.5638 Success 
7 Overlapping-Pairs-Sparse-Occupancy 0.5704 Success 
8 Overlapping-Quadruples-Sparse-Occupancy 0.5193 Success 
9 DNA 0.4021 Success 
10 Count-The-1’s (on stream of bytes) 0.2279 Success 
11 Count0-The-1’s (on specific bytes) 0.5343 Success 
12 Parking Lot 0.9362 Success 
13 Minimum Distance 0.2327 Success 
14 3D Spheres 0.3366 Success 
15 Squeeze 0.4369 Success 
16 Overlapping Sums 0.6415 Success 
17 Runs 0.5000 Success 
18 Craps 0.5579 Success 
 
 
 
 
 
